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Promotion of work is prominent in the rhetoric of current welfare reform efforts. The success of
welfare-to-work policies is in part dependent on earnings available in employment. In this paper we use
Current Population Survey data for the years 1972–1994 to develop measures of potential earnings from
full-time work for low-skilled men and women in California and to compare the trend in earnings capacity
for such people to welfare benefits. We find that while benefits have declined, earnings capacity has fallen
faster, and the downward trend is particularly pronounced for men. Both the downward trends in benefits
and potential earnings appear to have accelerated in recent years. State attempts to address the problem of
low wages by expanding the opportunity for combining welfare with work may conflict with federal efforts
to require that assistance be transitory.Conference report on H.R. 3734, Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
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Act of 1966, Section 401(a)(2). Congressional Record, July 30, 1996, H8831.
The state’s plan does not include a sufficiency benchmark. The equity principle is a restatement of
2
the “least benefit” principle of the English Poor Law of 1834. The fact that earnings from employment
exceed the welfare stipend does not guarantee that work will be more attractive, since time and other costs
are presumably also involved in the labor-supply calculus.
Welfare Reform and the Labor Market:
Earnings Potential and Welfare Benefits in California, 1972–1994
Promotion of work is prominent in the rhetoric of current welfare reform efforts. One of the stated
purposes of the block grant system for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) established by
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) is to “end the
dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage.”
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In a similar spirit, California’s Proposed Redesign of the Welfare System calls for “changing the overall
purpose of welfare . . . to provide time-limited assistance to families in crisis” and “achieving independence
through work while at the same time strengthening and supporting children and families” (California
Department of Social Services 1996: 2).
Talking about work in connection with welfare is not new. The novelty in the current debate is the
emphasis placed on devolution of responsibility for design and conduct of work-oriented policy to the states
and upon making assistance short-term. Both federal and state policy makers seem to believe that with
relatively modest effort households in need can be moved to self-support. This is to be accomplished in part
by making use of public assistance less attractive than work. Again in the words of California policy
makers, “the benchmark against which welfare eligibility and benefit packages will be structured is fairness
and equity with low-income working families. This is consistent with the principle that welfare should not
pay more than work” (California Department of Social Services 1996: 2). We term this California principle
the equity benchmark.  
22
All AFDC recipients are categorically eligible for Medi-Cal. Medi-Cal is California’s version of
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Medicaid, the medical insurance program provided for AFDC recipients and certain other low-income
families. Because Medi-Cal covers virtually all common health costs, the AFDC and Food Stamps benefit
used in this analysis is deflated by the consumer price index for expenditures other than medical care. Food
Stamp benefits are calculated assuming the maximum allowable shelter allowance and no other household
income.
Success in attaining the goals of making assistance temporary and satisfying the equity benchmark
is very much dependent upon circumstances in the labor market. This paper develops measures of potential
earnings or earnings capacity of women and men who work full time in California, and we compare
earnings trends to trends in welfare benefits. We find that earnings capacity has declined for men and
women with characteristics associated with risk of need for public assistance and that this decline has been
particularly sharp since the late 1980s. We argue that recent welfare policies adopted in California to
encourage recipients to combine work with welfare make sense in the context of what seems to be
happening to earnings, but that desirable policy from California’s perspective may be inconsistent with
time limits imposed by PRWORA.
TRENDS IN WELFARE AND WAGES
We begin by looking at data on welfare benefits and the earnings of women and men.
For our purpose, welfare benefits include the AFDC payment and the value of the Food Stamps
that come with AFDC. We ignore for the time being benefits received from other programs, although we
will return to them at the end of the paper.  The data are plotted in Figure 1.
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The message of Figure 1 is that between 1972 and 1990 real benefits changed very little. For a
family of three, the value of AFDC and Food Stamp benefits averaged about $11,000 per year in 1994
dollars. Since 1990, the state has cut back benefits substantially, so that the average (July) benefit level for
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available from work on the outside have not declined or improved, the benefit trend has raised the
likelihood that the state’s system meets the equity standard, that is, that welfare pays less than work.
Data on welfare benefits are available from administrative sources. Data on potential earnings are
more difficult to come by. In this paper we base our analysis of trends in potential earnings on income from
work reported by California women and men in the March Current Population Survey (CPS) for each year
from 1973 to 1995. The March surveys include questions about earnings and other sources of income for
individuals in the preceding year as well as total weeks worked and hours typically worked per week. The
sample is sizable and approximately representative (when appropriately weighted) of the state’s population.
For our purposes, a major shortcoming of the data is the absence of precise information on the hourly
wage. The usual approach is to construct an hourly wage by dividing reported annual earnings by the
product of hours typically worked per week and total weeks worked. Since all three variables are measured
with error, the result is of questionable utility.
To avoid errors engendered by the absence of hourly wage data, we take as a first indicator of the
trend in earnings potential the reported earnings of all civilian men and women age 18–44 who claim to
have worked full time for the entire year preceding the survey. We define “full time” to mean working 35 or
more hours per week; “all year” means 50 or more weeks (including paid vacations). Since the earnings
distribution tends to be skewed, we calculate both the (weighted) mean and median earnings for our sample
from each survey. Given the retrospective character of the survey, this means we have earnings for calendar
years 1972 through 1994. The results appear in Figure 2.
At least four features of these plots seem important. First, for both men and women it appears that
the degree of skewness in the dispersion of earnings, as reflected in the difference between the mean and
median of the sample distribution, is increasing. Second, at least since the early 1980s, the earnings of
women who work full time have been rising relative to the earnings of their male counterparts. Within the
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We should include precautions concerning the incidence of nonreporting and census procedures
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for imputation of missing earnings data as well, since both have changed over time. Education was not
included among the variables used to impute missing income values until 1976 (Lillard et al. 1986).
by 1992–94 this percentage had risen to 89 percent. Third, the gain in relative earnings has been
accomplished both because women’s earnings have been rising and because the real earnings of men have
been falling. Finally, the medians are substantial—approximately $28,000 for men and $25,000 for women
in 1994.
At first pass and viewed from the perspective of the welfare reform objectives cited earlier, there is
good and bad news here. On the good side, if all women are experiencing the upward trend in earnings
evident in the figure, potential earnings would appear to be rising relative to welfare benefits. On the bad
side, if the potential earnings of fathers of children at risk of poverty follow the trend evident for all men,
the attractiveness to women of marriage as a means of gaining economic resources is diminishing.
However provocative, caution must be exercised in drawing conclusions about labor market trends
from these simple plots. The raw earnings data from the CPS may be very misleading as indicators. There
are two culprits in this deception: mixture and selection.  Mixture involves the changing composition of the
4
workforce. Over the 23 years covered by our CPS data, California’s population has changed substantially
in ways certain to affect potential earnings. In particular, the distribution of the population by age,
education, race, and location has altered. If levels and trends in potential earnings differ across subgroups
defined by such variables, then year-to-year changes in average earnings may reflect a changing population
mix and not variation in the prospects for individuals.
The selection problem is obvious: Since 1972 labor force participation has changed dramatically
for women and substantially for men. In 1972–74 about 26 percent of women aged 18–44 in the state
reported working full time, full year by our definition. By 1992–94 this had increased to 42 percent. The
corresponding change for men is from 57 to 65 percent. Many of the remainder worked, but not full time.
Since it is likely to be good wages that attract and enable workers to stay in the same job all year,7
This method of selection adjustment relies on very stringent functional form assumptions. For
5
discussions, see for example Goldberger (1983) and Stolzenberg and Relles (1990).
inferences drawn from trends in earnings only for full-time, full-year workers are undoubtedly biased as an
indicator of trends in potential earnings for the entire population. This problem is exacerbated by cyclical
variation in the ability of workers to avoid joblessness.
One additional problem pertinent to our concern with the relationship between trends in earnings
and trends in welfare should be noted. Welfare payments are not subject to income taxation or withholding
for unemployment insurance and social security. To the extent that tax liability has varied over the period
we discuss, actual trends in take-home pay may differ from those evident in Figure 2.
ESTIMATING POTENTIAL EARNINGS
To examine trends in earnings for workers holding characteristics constant, we have developed a
measure of gross earnings capacity (GEC) by year by regressing earnings for each full-time, full-year
worker in our data on a set of variables reflecting location and personal characteristics believed to affect
what people are paid for working. To correct for selection bias, we use the two-stage correction procedure
first proposed by Heckman (1976).  Comparison of selection-adjusted predicted earnings from year to year
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given the same characteristics permits isolation of the influence of general wage trends. To recognize the
consequences for take-home pay brought about by changes in tax law, a measure of net earnings capacity
(NEC) is developed by subtracting net tax liability (as reduced by the Earned Income Tax Credit) from
GEC. The procedure is repeated for each year’s data. In this section we review the selection adjustment
procedure, estimation of the earnings function, and the adjustment made to obtain the NEC.
Since the Heckman adjustment procedure is well-known, we provide only a brief summary that
emphasizes application in this context. In the first stage of the procedure, the probability of being a full-






California residents meeting our age restriction. Independent variables employed in this model include
location of residence (central city, remainder of Metropolitan Statistical Area, outside of MSA), race,
education, age, health status, marital status, and number of children. From this equation,   (termed the
inverse Mills ratio) is estimated for each individual, where 
In equation (1),   and   are, respectively, the density and cumulative distribution function of a standard
normal variable, w is a vector of independent variables, and   is a vector of estimated coefficients.
In the second stage, the sample is restricted to full-time workers, and earnings are estimated using
ordinary least squares (OLS). The estimated earnings equation is of the form
where LOGEARN is the logarithm of observed earnings, X includes demographic characteristics that may
affect earnings,   is the Heckman selection correction term (see equation (1)), and   is the random error
term distributed N(0, ). Independent variables included in X are location of residence, race, education, and
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age. The inclusion of   compensates for the increased conditional mean earnings in the truncated sample
and thus yields consistent estimates of  .
Given the regressions for each year 1972–94, earnings capacity was calculated in two steps. In the
first step, a vector of demographic characteristics for a representative individual, X, was selected. These
characteristics and the parameter estimates were then combined to produce expected logarithm of earnings
for this representative case. In the second step, expected logarithm of earnings was transformed into dollar
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The fact that the antilog of predicted logarithm of earnings is the conditional median, and not the
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conditional mean, expected value of earnings is still occasionally ignored. In evaluating trends, as we want
to do, the difference between the conditional median value of earnings and the conditional mean value
acquires significance if there is a time trend in the estimated value of  .
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the predicted logarithm of earnings gives predicted median gross earnings.  To compare our results to those
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from studies using mean earnings, we also compute mean predicted gross earnings by multiplying median
predicted gross earnings by exp(½ ), where   is the estimated standard error of the regression.  Nominal
2 7
earnings are converted to 1994 dollars using the CPI-U. To summarize:
Since taxes may affect returns to working, we also calculate net earnings. Net earnings capacity
(NEC) is defined as GEC minus estimated net taxes due at that level of earnings for a three-person family
with no other income. Net taxes are estimated federal income tax (FEDTAX) and Social Security tax
(FICA) liability minus the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). We ignore California state income tax
liability because at the levels of earnings considered here a single-parent family has no state income tax
liability. To summarize:10
Note that the estimate of mean net earnings capacity reflected in (6) is biased because   is not
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estimated from a sample of observations on net earnings. If on balance the tax system is progressive, the
bias will be to exaggerate the difference between predicted median and mean NEC.
RESULTS FOR WOMEN
We present our results for women in detail. Procedures for the estimating earnings capacity for
men are identical.
The Earnings Regression
We use the results from the 1995 CPS to illustrate our procedure. The data are from the 1995 CPS
and therefore cover 1994. Appendix 1 provides a description of the variables in the 1995 CPS probit and
earnings regressions. This list is representative of the variables used over the entire time period, although
some definitions were not uniform over all 23 years due to changes in the CPS survey. The availability of
the data is noted in the definition.
Tables 1 and 2 provide a sample of the results of the two-step estimation procedure. Table 1 shows
the results from the first-stage probit estimation, and Table 2 shows the results of the second-stage OLS
estimation. Complete results for all 23 years are available from the authors upon request.
We next calculate expected earnings for a representative woman. By “representative” we mean that
variables for which effects are not explicitly displayed are set at levels judged to reflect the circumstances
of women age 15–44 at the time of the survey and at risk of receiving welfare. The11
TABLE 1
Female Probit Equation Estimation Results:
Probability of Full-Time, Full-Year Employment, 1995
Variable Mean Std. Dev Coefficient Std. Error 
CITY 0.3579 0.4795 0.2787 0.1751
SUBURB 0.5693 0.4953 0.3169* 0.1723
NOTID 0.0331 0.1789 0.1337 0.2440
BLACK 0.0712 0.2572 0.1247 0.1319
ASIAN 0.0878 0.2830 0.0827 0.0989
HISPANIC 0.3504 0.4772 0.2120 0.0719
OTHER 0.0111 0.1046 -0.0152 0.2534
ED 12.2215 3.4776 0.0472*** 0.0172
HSGRAD 0.7799 0.4144 0.3283*** 0.1176
COLLGRAD 0.2017 0.4013 0.0920 0.0988
AGE 32.4508 7.1732 0.1325*** 0.0322
AGE24 8.8600 6.5399 -0.0754** 0.0381
AGE34 2.3065 3.2546 -0.0640*** 0.0195
MARRIED 0.5738 0.4946 -0.2166*** 0.0758
PREVMAR 0.1458 0.3530 0.0074*** 0.0995
NUMCHILD 1.278 1.300 -0.2467*** 0.0265
HEALTHPG 0.0220 0.1466 -0.3967** 0.1935
CONSTANT 1.0000 0.0000 -4.4945*** 0.7700
Dependent Variable: FTYR
Number of Observations: 2314
Mean of Dependent Variable: 0.4239
Standard Deviation of Dependent Variable: 0.4943
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.12
TABLE 2
Female Earnings Regressions Results:
Earnings from Full-Time, Full-Year Work, 1995
(Heckman Selection Model)
Variable Mean Std. Dev Coefficient Std. Error 
CITY 0.3512 0.4776 0.1690 0.1173
SUBURB 0.5941 0.4913 0.2139* 0.1159
NOTID 0.0249 0.1559 -0.1007 0.1613
BLACK 0.0869 0.2819 -0.1267 0.0709
ASIAN 0.0991 0.2989 -0.0815 0.0557
HISPANIC 0.2779 0.4482 -0.1664*** 0.0410
OTHER 0.0120 0.1089 -0.1507 0.1419
ED 13.2892 2.7290 0.0314** 0.0153
HSGRAD 0.8942 0.3077 0.4417*** 0.0866
HSINT 1.7365 1.7819 0.1028*** 0.0314
COLLGRAD 0.2829 0.4506 0.0104 0.0996
COLLINT 0.0942 0.3431 -0.0589 0.0655
EXPER 14.4610 6.9836 0.0450*** 0.0090
EXP2 257.8383 206.6696 -0.0007** 0.0003
CONSTANT 1.000 0.0000 8.4263*** 0.2317
LAMBDA — — 0.0903 0.0630
Dependent Variable: LGEARN
Number of Observations: 943
Mean of Dependent Variable: 10.0631
Std. Deviation of Dependent Variable: 0.6140
Log Likelihood: -2048.03
R  (unadjusted): .33
2
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.13
variable values used in this calculation are summarized in Table 3. We assume the representative woman
reports never being married, since this is the circumstance of most women receiving AFDC.
Data from the 1980 census were used to calculate variable values for residential and race/ethnic
classification. The variable values are an estimate of the proportion of females at risk that are in each
classification. The number of women at risk by classification was estimated by multiplying the proportion
of each classification with income under 125 percent of poverty by the number of females in each
classification age 15–44. Residential classifications used in the regression are urban (individuals living in a
central city), suburban (individuals living in the balance of the MSA), and rural (individuals living in an
area outside an MSA). The estimates are 0.35 for urban, 0.60 for suburban, and 0.05 for rural. Race/ethnic
classifications used in the regression are white, black, Hispanic, Asian, and other. The estimates are 0.45
for white, 0.15 for black, 0.34 for Hispanic, 0.06 for Asian, and 0 for other (less than 2 percent of the
sample).
The census offers no tabulation of persons by education and poverty status, so we used the finding
from Burtless (1994) that approximately half the 25-year-old women who reported receiving welfare in the
year prior to each survey from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth for the period 1979–1990
reported having competed high school and none had a four-year college degree. Therefore, the earnings
predictions we use are an average of log predicted wages of an individual with 11 years of education and an
individual with a high school degree. In all cases the representative individual is assumed to be 25 years
old.
Figure 3 presents the results of calculation of mean and median GEC from the regression results
for each year’s CPS sample (see equations (3) and (4)) for the representative woman. In Figure 4 the CPS
sample median (see Figure 2) is plotted with the predicted median for the representative woman.
Once again, there are things to note. 14
TABLE 3
Variable Weights Used in Calculating Probability of Full-Time Employment
and Representative Gross Earning Capacity
Weight in  Weight in
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Estimated Median GEC and Median Earnings
FIGURE 417
First, the GEC estimates for 1972 and 1994 are anomalous, with the 1972 number implausibly
high and the change between 1993 and 1994 implausibly great. We have conducted extensive analyses of
both estimates, and we can find no error. A contributing factor to the high 1972 estimate appears to be
exceptional earnings among persons in the March 1973 sample with less than a high school education. In
samples subsequent to 1973, reported earnings are much lower among persons reporting this level of
educational attainment. The decline in 1994 seems to be supported by examination of raw means and
medians by subgroups: all median earnings by education go down except for those with college degrees.
Second, the data for average earnings of full-time, full-year workers and the estimates for GEC
present a substantially different picture of the California labor market when viewed from the perspective of
women likely to be at risk of need for public assistance. Calculation of trends is sensitive to choice of
endpoints; here we use 1975 and 1993 as two points similarly situated in the business cycle that avoid the
possible anomaly in 1972–73 and 1994. Between 1975 and 1993 median earnings for women in the CPS
sample working full time increased by 11.7 percent, while estimated median GEC for our representative
woman fell by 10.5 percent and real benefits declined 11.6 percent. Thus, over the long run, the decline in
benefits has exceeded the decline in earnings capacity. However, recent experience has been much different.
Between 1987–89 and 1992–94, real benefits fell by 10 percent, while estimated earnings capacity declined
by 19 percent.
Third, unlike the results for the sample as a whole, the difference between predicted mean and
median GEC is relatively constant over time, which is another way of saying that the standard errors of the
selection-adjusted earnings estimates are relatively stable (see equation (4)). There is a modest negative
correlation (  = -.17) across years between estimated GEC and the state’s unemployment rate, while the
correlation between the variance of the GEC estimates and the level of the state unemployment rate is18
It is possible that the positive negative correlation between GEC and state unemployment rates is
8
attributable to cyclical variability of hours within the “full-time” category. Recall all persons working 35
hours or more per week are classed as full time.
positive (  = .07).  Nevertheless, our results suggest that the growing variance in earnings evident in
8
unadjusted data is primarily a mixture problem, that is the growing inequality of earnings of women
working full-time is attributable to growing variation in the characteristics that produce differences in
expected return from work or to growing variation in the earnings payoff associated with the various
factors identified in the regression.
Finally, while it is not our intention in this paper to evaluate human capital strategies for improving
earnings, we note our regressions are not very encouraging on this score. In Figure 5 we plot calculated
GEC for our representative woman under three alternative assumptions about education: (1) that she has
completed 11 years (i.e., less than high school), (2) that she has a high school degree, and (3) that she has a
college degree. We continue to assume that she is 25 years old, so the progression from high school degree
to college degree reduces experience from 7 to 3 years. Clearly, while moving from less than a high school
degree to diploma status leads to higher predicted earnings, and the gap between these statuses has grown,
the downward trend in potential earnings is present both for those with and without a high school degree.
Net Economic Capacity
The final adjustment is to account for changes in tax liability. Median NEC was computed on the
basis of applicable tax law. Appendix 2 shows each component used in our calculation of the two
measures. We did not include California taxes because a woman in the circumstances we have constructed
would not be liable for them. Our measures of median GEC and NEC are plotted in Figure 6.
The data in Appendix 2 and Figure 6 illustrate tax trends over the period. The upward trend in
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FIGURE 621
$3,000, the average tax rate increased from 13.6 percent to 14.4 percent. After 1979, real GEC began to
fall, but average tax rates remained above 14 percent until the provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
became effective in 1987. After 1986, lower federal income taxes and the EITC offset the small increase in
Social Security taxes, and real GEC grew until 1991.
The downward trend in average tax rates can be seen by comparing 1984 and 1990. In both years
the representative individual is estimated to receive approximately the same GEC, yet the average tax rate
declined from 14.3 percent to 9.2 percent. The increase in the EITC after 1992, combined with lower
earnings, dramatically lowered average tax rates, to the extent that the representative woman would receive
a net tax credit in 1994. A linear regression of GEC on time reveals a decline of about 22 percent (.96
percent per year) over the entire 1972–94 interval. A linear regression of NEC on time reveals a decline of
about 16.4 percent (.71 percent per year) over the entire 1972–94 interval. The favorable impact of taxes
on trend is largely attributable to the expansion of the Earned Income Credit contained in the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, with some decline also due to the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
THE RESULTS FOR MEN
For purposes of comparison, we have repeated our method using men rather than women. The
results for the 1995 CPS are reported in Appendix 3. Figure 7 is the equivalent for men of Figure 4. As
comparison of the two figures indicates, selection and mixture adjustment has much less effect for men than
was the case for women. However, the conclusion is the same: That earnings prospects for relatively low-
skilled workers in California have declined substantially over the past decade. In the men’s case the decline
from 1988–90 to 1993–95 continued a trend established at the beginning of the 1980s. The change—wages
down by 11 percent—is only slightly less than that experienced by women. The cumulative change since
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COMPARISON WITH OTHER WORK
Haveman and Buron (1993) use earnings capacity to relate changes in earnings to changes in
poverty. They define families as “Earnings Capacity Poor” if they are unable to generate enough income to
lift themselves out of poverty, even if all working-age adults in the family work full time, year-round. They
find for households at risk of welfare receipt, namely female-headed households, earnings capacity poverty
incidence rates and official poverty rates decreased between 1973 and 1988. For all female-headed
households, earnings capacity poverty rates declined 26 percent, while official poverty rates decreased 9
percent. For female-headed households with children, earnings capacity poverty rates declined 19 percent,
while official poverty rates remained unchanged. Female-headed households of all races except white saw a
decline in earnings capacity poverty, i.e., an increase in earnings capacity. The implication is that were
employment rates to rise, poverty would fall.
Using the same time frame, the results of this investigation also show a substantial increase in
earnings capacity. Mean earnings capacity for the “representative individual” increased over 20 percent,
while median earnings capacity increased over 25 percent. However, as Figure 7 indicates, these results are
very sensitive to the years chosen. If 1972 were selected as the base period for comparison, both mean and
median predicted earnings would have declined. If 1974 is selected as base year there would be little change
evident. This caveat applies to all comparisons based on two years. Since the Haveman-Buron sample is
national and therefore larger than the one used here, it is possible that sensitivity of results to choice of year
is diminished.
Three other recent studies measure wage and earning trends over this time period, although none
does so on the basis of a measure of earnings capacity. Blank (1995) looks at changes in mean weekly
earnings of women between 1969 and 1989. She finds that earnings gains vary greatly by education status.
Women with less than 12 years of education have nearly no movement in real earnings over the period, with
earnings increasing 1.4 percent between 1969 and 1979 and declining 0.4 percent between 1979 and 1989.24
Women with a high school education saw real earnings increase only 0.7 percent between 1969 and 1979,
but saw a 10 percent real gain between 1979 to 1989. The largest earnings gains are for women with more
than 12 years of education. They saw a decline in earnings of 1.1 percent between 1969 and 1979, but a
25.1 percent increase between 1979 and 1989.
In contrast to the Blank results, studies by Bernstein and Mishel (1993) and Burtless (1995)
identify a large negative movement in wages and earnings after 1979. Bernstein and Mishel use CPS data
to examine hourly wages for women with a high school education or less in several years between 1979 and
1993. They find hourly wages fell steeply between 1979 and 1989, and continued to decline thereafter. For
females 16 to 25, wages fell between 16 and 17 percent between 1979 and 1993 for most education and
race categories. For females 26 to 35, wage changes varied depending on education and race. Wage
declines for high school graduates ranged from 4.9 percent for whites to 18.1 percent for blacks. For
women with less than a high school education, wage declines ranged from 11.8 percent for whites to 18.5
percent for blacks. Burtless reports that between 1979 and 1989 average full-time earnings received by
young female dropouts fell 10 percent.
The outcome of this study is closer to results of Bernstein and Mishel. For the “representative
individual,” mean earnings declined 14.4 percent between 1972 and 1979 and decreased an additional 16.5
percent between 1979 and 1989. In general it appears wages have declined for women with less than a
college education. Although not shown, our estimates for a woman with a college education show a decline
of 4.8 percent between 1972 and 1979 and an increase of 8.3 percent between 1979 and 1989.
Our results imply that the “gender gap” between men’s and women’s hourly (and as a result, full-
time, full-year) earnings has declined among workers with comparable secondary educational attainment.
This is consistent with the results of analysis of national data (cf. Blau and Kahn 1997) and aggregate data
on the distribution of hourly earnings in California (cf. Reed, Haber, and Mameesh 1996, Figures 3.3 and
3.7).25
SUMMARY
In this paper we have developed measures of potential earnings for men and women in California
over the period 1972–94. The results indicate that, other things equal, over this interval the potential
earnings of women in the state have declined slightly and the potential earnings for men have declined
substantially. Trends differ among groups, with earnings for those with only a high school education or less
falling relative to earnings for those with post–high school education.
The results are for full-time, full-year workers. They do not necessarily reflect trends in entry
wages, and they do not reveal any differential between new and continuing workers or between part- and
full-time workers in access to nonwage benefits such as health care. It is our impression that the availability
of such benefits has fallen over time; if this is true, their inclusion would strengthen our argument.
These trends pose problems for attaining the objectives of the new round of welfare reform. The
decline in potential earnings makes it increasingly difficult to assure that working families are better off
than those receiving assistance as required by California’s equity principle. The substantial decline in the
potential earnings of men suggests that marriage is a less certain route out of poverty than may have been
the case in the past. And there is little evidence to suggest that even when employment is obtained, time on
the job quickly pays off in terms of substantial wage increases.
Recent reforms in California’s welfare law address some of these problems. While benefits have
fallen sharply (see Figure 1), the state has liberalized eligibility and benefits calculation procedures to
enhance the opportunity for households to combine work with AFDC benefits to assure that employment
provides earnings gains. However, these policies have not incorporated time limits on income from welfare.
Retaining both the principle that assistance will be transitory and that those who work will be better off
than those who receive assistance may not be possible in the context of generally declining wages. At this
writing the state’s planners have yet to address the problem.2627
APPENDIX 1
Variable Definitions in the Earnings Capacity Equations
The sampled universe is civilian California women and men aged 18 to 44. Data are from the March CPS
for 1973–1995. Those self-employed or who missed work because of illness or school attendance are not
included.
Variable Definition
FTYR Dependent variable in Probit estimation:
= 1 if respondent works 35+ hours a week for 50+ weeks, else 0.
LGEARN Dependent variable in earnings estimation: the natural logarithm of total earnings for the
year.
AGE  Age of respondent in years.
AGE24   = max{AGE - 24, 0}
AGE34  = max{AGE - 34, 0}
ED  Number of years of education completed.
HSGRAD  = 1 if ED   12, else 0.
HSINT  =  max{ED - 12, 0}
COLLGRAD  =  1 if ED   16, else 0. 
COLLINT  = max{ED - 16, 0}
EXPER = max{AGE - ED - 6, 0)
EXP2 = (EXPER)
2
ASIAN = 1 if race/ethnicity reported as Asian, else 0. Not available before 1989.
HISPANIC  = 1 if race/ethnicity reported as Hispanic, else 0.
BLACK = 1 if race/ethnicity reported as African-American and not Hispanic, else 0.
OTHER = 1 if race/ethnicity reported not Hispanic, white, black, or Asian, else 0.
CITY  = 1 if residence reported as central city, else 0.
SUBURB = 1 if residence reported as balance of MSA, else 0.28
NOTID = 1 if, for confidentiality reasons, CPS does not identify residence location, else 0. Not
available before 1986.
HEALTHPG =  1 if respondent participates in a disability program, else 0.
Program participation includes any of the following:
(1) Receives social security or railroad retirement benefits and
(a) is not in school, is age 19–22, and is not widowed, divorced, or separated with
Dependent children; or
(b) is age 23–59, and is not widowed, divorced, or separated with Dependent
children.
(2) Receives Supplemental Security Income (SSI).
(3) Receives workers’ compensation.
(4) Receives veteran disability benefits, is a veteran, and is not in school.
MARRIED  = 1 if respondent married and not separated, else 0.
PREVMAR  =  1 if respondent currently unmarried and widowed, divorced or separated, else 0.
NUMCHILD  = Number of own children under 18 years of age.29
APPENDIX 2
Calculations of Before and After-Tax Earnings Capacity
for the Representative Female*
FEMALE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD WITH TWO DEPENDENT CHILDREN
Real Real Tax as
Nominal Nominal (1994) (1994) Percent of
Year GEC FEDTAX FICA EITC NEC GEC NEC  GEC
1972 7,276 611 378 0 6,287 25,795 22,289 13.6%
1973 4,820 184 282 0 4,355 16,087 14,535 9.6%
1974 6,784 521 397 0 5,865 20,394 17,632 13.5%
1975 6,617 440 387 138 5,930 18,228 16,336 10.4%
1976 7,763 629 454 24 6,703 20,219 17,460 13.6%
1977 7,702 425 451 30 6,891 18,835 16,852 10.5%
1978 9,592 769 580 0 8,277 21,802 18,813 13.7%
1979 11,110 923 681 0 9,510 22,680 19,412 14.4%
1980 11,080 914 679 0 9,486 19,928 17,062 14.4%
1981 10,923 875 726 0 9,311 17,809 15,180 14.8%
1982 13,402 1,243 898 0 11,265 20,582 17,301 15.9%
1983 12,486 974 837 0 10,674 18,578 15,882 14.5%
1984 12,389 906 867 0 10,614 17,671 15,139 14.3%
1985 14,069 1,150 992 0 11,932 19,378 16,434 15.2%
1986 12,890 894 922 0 11,078 17,429 14,979 14.1%
1987 14,160 541 1,012 127 12,736 18,473 16,615 10.1%
1988 16,098 874 1,209 248 14,260 20,174 17,871 11.4%
1989 15,448 731 1,160 389 13,943 18,468 16,668 9.7%
1990 15,596 701 1,193 466 14,165 17,690 16,067 9.2%
1991 18,443 1,046 1,411 346 16,329 20,069 17,769 11.5%
1992 15,766 544 1,206 868 14,886 16,759 15,824 5.6%
1993 15,914 514 1,217 994 15,178 16,322 15,567 4.6%
1994 12,228 0 935 1,995 13,287 12,228 13,287 -8.7%
(table continues)30
APPENDIX 2, continued
Calculations of Before and After-Tax Earnings Capacity
for the Representative Male*
SOLE EARNER MARRIED MALE WITH TWO DEPENDENT CHILDREN
Real Real Tax as
Nominal Nominal (1994) (1994) Percent of
Year GEC FEDTAX FICA EITC NEC GEC NEC  GEC
1972 10,692 1,017 556 0 9,119 37,908 32,332 14.7%
1973 12,679 1,338 742 0 10,600 42,321 35,380 16.4%
1974 13,808 1,558 808 0 11,443 41,508 34,397 17.1%
1975 14,295 1,602 836 0 11,857 39,378 32,662 17.1%
1976 13,387 1,430 783 0 11,174 34,867 29,103 16.5%
1977 16,368 1,637 958 0 13,774 40,029 33,684 15.9%
1978 18,666 2,143 1,129 0 15,394 42,428 34,991 17.5%
1979 17,613 1,764 1,080 0 14,770 35,954 30,150 16.1%
1980 22,016 2,749 1,350 0 17,918 39,597 32,226 18.6%
1981 21,536 2,634 1,432 0 17,470 35,112 28,483 18.9%
1982 24,495 3,011 1,641 0 19,843 37,618 30,474 19.0%
1983 22,950 2,411 1,538 0 19,006 34,149 28,280 17.2%
1984 24,702 2,613 1,729 0 20,365 35,234 29,048 17.6%
1985 22,364 2,095 1,577 0 18,696 30,802 25,751 16.4%
1986 22,603 2,060 1,616 0 18,926 30,564 25,591 16.3%
1987 26,956 2,066 1,927 0 22,965 35,166 29,959 14.8%
1988 24,311 1,729 1,826 0 20,759 30,467 26,015 14.6%
1989 28,417 2,284 2,134 0 24,000 33,972 28,692 15.5%
1990 24,946 1,691 1,908 0 21,343 28,295 24,208 14.4%
1991 25,149 1,624 1,924 0 21,598 27,367 23,502 14.1%
1992 29,210 2,104 2,235 0 24,874 31,051 26,441 14.8%
1993 25,902 1,549 1,981 0 22,375 26,565 22,948 13.6%
1994 25,667 1,429 1,964 0 22,276 25,667 22,276 13.2%
Source: Authors’ calculation using the following sources: 1. FEDTAX: computed using yearly tax tables
from each year’s IRS Form 1040. 2. FICA: Committee on Ways and Means 1994, p. 76. 3. EITC:
Committee on Ways and Means 1994, p. 700.
*See Table 3.31
APPENDIX 3
Male Probit Equation Estimation Results
Probability of Full-Time Full-Year Employment, 1995
Variable Mean Std. Dev Coefficient Std. Error 
CITY 0.3646 0.4814 0.3666** 0.1630
SUBURB 0.5741 0.4946 0.5102*** 0.1607
NOTID 0.0287 0.1669 -0.1599 0.2272
BLACK 0.0467 0.2111 -0.4909*** 0.1282
ASIAN 0.0935 0.2913 -0.0100 0.0893
HISPANIC 0.3646 0.4815 0.0814 0.0626
OTHER 0.0148 0.2913 0.1307 0.1998
ED 12.5644 3.4336 0.0332** 0.0133
HSGRAD 0.7986 0.4011 0.0750 0.0953
COLLGRAD 0.2564 0.4368 0.2572*** 0.0856
AGE 32.9938 6.4907 0.1435*** 0.0117
AGE24 9.2073 6.1242 -0.1086*** 0.0136
AGE34 2.2387 3.2345 -0.0477*** 0.0090
MARRIED 0.5543 0.4972 0.3299*** 0.0323
PREVMAR 0.0956 0.2942 0.1262** 0.0568
NUMCHILD 1.0206 1.2363 -0.0332*** 0.0115
HEALTHPG 0.0051 0.0711 -0.5037*** 0.1288
CONSTANT 1.0000 0.0000 -4.1213*** 0.3413
Dependent Variable: FTYR
Number of Observations: 2166
Mean of Dependent Variable: 0.6758
Standard Deviation of Dependent Variable: 0.4682
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.
(table continues)32
APPENDIX 3, continued
Male Earnings Regressions Results
Earnings from Full-Time Full-Year Work, 1995
(Heckman Selection Model)
Variable Mean Std. Dev Coefficient Std. Error 
CITY 0.3541 0.4784 0.0885 0.0874
SUBURB 0.6008 0.4899 0.1332 0.0862
NOTID 0.2037 0.1553 0.3711*** 0.1219
BLACK 0.0467 0.2111 0.0389 0.0687
ASIAN 0.0935 0.2913 -0.1515*** 0.0458
HISPANIC 0.3646 0.4815 -0.2664*** 0.0326
OTHER 0.0148 0.1206 -0.0869 0.1066
ED 12.5644 3.4336 0.0242*** 0.0078
HSGRAD 0.7986 0.4011 0.1218** 0.0503
HSINT 1.4895 1.8353 0.1412*** 0.0137
COLLGRAD 0.2564 0.4368 -0.2984*** 0.0605
COLLINT 0.1030 0.3803 0.0032 0.0384
EXPER 14.4294 6.9296 0.0430*** 0.0038
EXP2 256.1958 219.3413 -0.0007*** 0.0001
CONSTANT 1.0000 0.0000 9.5131*** 0.1210
LAMBDA — — -0.5465*** 0.0655
Dependent Variable: LGEARN
Number of Observations: 1491
Mean of Dependent Variable: 10.1839
Std. Deviation of Dependent Variable: 0.7163
Log Likelihood: -3324.50
R  (unadjusted): .41
2
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.33
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